Can the government walk into a church, remove its trustees, and take control of its affairs? At what point does legitimate regulation become unconstitutional interference?

How far can the government intervention in churches in Nigeria extend as it regulates religious bodies? Moreover, the issue has recently come under judicial scrutiny. It concerns the management of religious organizations and their trustees.

A recent Court of Appeal decision drew an important constitutional line. It raises questions about government authority over religious and voluntary organizations, and how much control the government should have. Moreover, the decision touches the protection afforded to freedom of religion under the Nigerian Constitution.

These questions may sound hypothetical, but they have found their way into Nigeria’s courts.

The government intervention in churches in Nigeria could redefine boundaries between regulation, religious freedom, and private associations.

Imagine waking up one morning to discover that the government could suspend the trustees responsible for running your church, mosque, charity or association and appoint people to take over its affairs.

Would that be regulation? Or would it be government interference in a private association protected by the Constitution?

That question has been sitting quietly in Nigeria’s courts for several years. Now, the Court of Appeal has given a significant answer. And the answer could have consequences far beyond churches and religious organizations.

The Controversy Began with CAMA 2020

When the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (CAMA) was introduced, it was presented as a major reform of Nigeria’s corporate environment.

But some of its provisions concerning incorporated trustees immediately attracted controversy.

Incorporated trustees include a wide range of organizations: religious bodies, charities, professional associations, community organizations and other non-profit groups.

The controversial provisions gave the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) considerable powers to intervene in the affairs of incorporated trustees in specified circumstances.

Among other things, Section 839 provided mechanisms for the suspension of trustees and the appointment of interim managers where circumstances such as misconduct, mismanagement, fraud or public-interest concerns arose.

On paper, there was a straightforward argument for such powers. If an organization controls property, receives donations, manages funds or operates for the benefit of members and the public, shouldn’t the government have some mechanism for preventing abuse?

Of course. But there was another question, who watches the regulator? And more importantly: At what point does regulation become unconstitutional interference?

One Lawyer Decided to Challenge the Law

In August 2020, constitutional lawyer Emmanuel Ekpenyong instituted proceedings challenging several provisions of CAMA.

He argued that the provisions infringed constitutionally protected rights, particularly the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of association and peaceful assembly.

Those rights are protected by Sections 38 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution.

The case eventually reached the Federal High Court in Abuja.

In April 2023, Justice James Omotosho agreed with Ekpenyong on the substance of the challenge and declared several of the disputed provisions unconstitutional.

The CAC appealed. The case then moved to the Court of Appeal.

What did the Court of Appeal Just Decide?

In a unanimous judgment delivered on the 17^th September 2026, the Court of Appeal in Abuja substantially affirmed the Federal High Court’s decision.

The appellate court held that Sections 839, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847 and 848 of CAMA infringed constitutional protections relating to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of association and peaceful assembly.

The court therefore upheld their nullification.

But there is an important detail that has already been lost in some of the public discussion. The judgment does not mean that the CAC has suddenly lost every regulatory power over incorporated trustees.

Nor does it mean that churches, mosques, charities and other incorporated trustees are now completely outside the regulatory framework. The court drew a constitutional boundary around particular powers. That distinction matters.

Accountability Is Not the Enemy

There is a temptation to interpret this case as a simple battle between “government regulation” and “religious freedom”. It is more complicated than that. Consider a large religious organization that owns valuable properties, employs hundreds of people, and receives millions of naira in donations, or a charity entrusted with funds meant for vulnerable Nigerians. What happens if the trustees begin diverting the organization’s money? What happens if there is serious mismanagement? What happens if trustees fight among themselves and the organization’s assets are placed at risk?

It would be difficult to argue that the state should simply look away.

Accountability matters, Transparency matters, Protection of beneficiaries and members matters.

The real constitutional question is not whether government may regulate.

It is how far government can go before regulation becomes unconstitutional interference.

That is where this case becomes fascinating.

Section 38 Versus the Regulatory State

Section 38 of the Constitution protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Section 40 protects the right to assemble freely and associate with other persons.

These are not merely abstract constitutional ideals.

They are the legal foundations upon which religious and voluntary associations exist.

A church is an association; A mosque is an association; A professional body is an association; A charity is an association. The government may regulate aspects of their activities where the Constitution permits it. But regulation cannot simply erase the constitutional freedom that makes association possible in the first place. This is the constitutional tension at the heart of the case.

The Court Also Addressed Something Else: The Courts

There was another important issue involving Section 851 of CAMA. The Federal High Court had also struck down that provision. The Court of Appeal took a more nuanced approach.

It held that Section 851 was unconstitutional only to the extent that it purported to give the Administrative Proceedings Committee power to determine justifiable disputes at first instance and effectively exercise judicial powers. The court preserved the committee’s remaining administrative and regulatory functions, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

That is significant. It reinforces a fundamental constitutional principle:

Administrative bodies can administer and regulate, but they cannot simply assume the constitutional role of the courts. In other words, a government agency cannot create an administrative shortcut around judicial power where the Constitution places that judicial authority in the courts.

The Bigger Question: Who Regulates the Regulators?

This case raises a question that goes well beyond CAMA. Nigeria increasingly relies on regulatory agencies to supervise almost every important area of public and private life.

There are regulators for companies, Banks, Telecommunications, Securities, Data protection, Competition, Elections, Financial crimes, non-governmental organizations, The list continues to grow.

Regulation is necessary in a modern state. But every regulator creates the possibility of regulatory overreach. That is why constitutional limits matter. The existence of a government agency does not automatically mean that everything the agency wants to do is lawful.

A regulator must remain within the powers granted to it by legislation. And the legislation itself must remain within the Constitution. That is the hierarchy that matters.

What Does this Mean for Churches and Other Organizations?

And there is still one more chapter to this story

The Court of Appeal is not Nigeria’s final court. The Supreme Court remains the ultimate judicial authority on the constitutional questions raised by the case. That means this may not be the last word.

If the matter proceeds to the Supreme Court, the eventual decision could provide even greater clarity concerning the relationship between government regulation, incorporated trustees, religious freedom, freedom of association and judicial power.

That would make the case one worth watching closely.

The Real Lesson

Perhaps the most important lesson from this controversy is that constitutional rights are tested most seriously when the government has a seemingly legitimate reason for restricting them.

It is easy to defend freedom when nobody wants to interfere with it. The difficult question comes when the government says: “We are only trying to prevent abuse”. Sometimes that may be true.

But constitutional democracy requires another question to be asked; “And who decides how far you are allowed to go?”

The Court of Appeal has now drawn a line. It has said, in substance, that the state’s legitimate interest in regulation does not give it unlimited power over associations protected by the Constitution. That principle is bigger than CAMA.

It is a reminder that in a constitutional democracy, even a good regulatory objective must be pursued through lawful and constitutionally permissible means.

And perhaps that is the most interesting part of this case.

The dispute started with provisions concerning churches, charities and incorporated trustees.

But the underlying question is one every Nigerian should care about: When the government acquires the power to regulate us, who regulates the government?

Legal note

This article discusses a developing legal issue for public education and commentary. It is not intended to constitute legal advice. The Court of Appeal decision may be subject to further appeal.

Key authorities and sources:

• Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, particularly Sections 839–851.
• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), particularly Sections 38, 40 and 251.
• Emmanuel Ekpenyong v. National Assembly & Ors, FHC/ABJ/CS/1076/2020 and the subsequent Court of Appeal proceedings.
• Recent reporting on the Court of Appeal judgment confirms the substantial affirmation of the Federal High Court’s decision while noting the court’s modification concerning Section 851.